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ASPECTS OF PROGRESS  
What is the nature of human ‘progress’? Few ideas in the modern world are as prominent, as widely 
held or as influential. Indeed, the notion of progress is a defining characteristic of modernity itself. 
Most recently, key progressive themes are reproduced in debates about ‘Sustainable Development’. 
Yet the details are often ambiguous. They become more so, the more carefully they are considered. 
At the deepest level, our understandings seem to spring from two quite distinct but mutually-
entwined roots.  
 
On the one hand, there are normative visions for progress – evaluative frameworks under which we 
might judge whether change is for better or worse. These are defined according to different 
institutional, political or cultural commitments. Each vision variously encompasses interests, values 
and aspirations concerning how we may better understand the world; the manners in which we 
should act in (or on) Nature; and the ways in which we ought to relate to one another and structure 
society. It is a common feature of disparate notions of progress, that commitments in these 
contrasting areas are consistently seen as interlinked and co-determining. However conceived, 
progress in our ways of knowing is seen to foster progress in our ways of acting, which together help 
achieve progress in the ways we live. Appeals to these kinds of resonating normativities of progress 
help shape contemporary politics. Yet the detailed values in question in any given instance are 
frequently left unstated. In policy debates around the world, there are few more effective ways to 
advocate a contested normative position (or vested interest), than simply to ignore alternatives and 
assert it as ‘the way forward’.  
 
This leads, on the other hand, to an ontological aspect of progress – represented as an inexorable 
driving force in human affairs. This is not so much about the way we want things to be, as how we 
think they actually are. In this guise, progress is encountered – whether we like it or not – as a 
supposedly inescapable determinant in the evolution of our knowledges, technologies and societies. 
Obscured by uncertainties, the detailed configurations of progress are typically not resolvable in 
advance. As with normative values, the specific characteristics of these ontologies of progress also 
vary across perspectives. But the common denominator is, that knowledges, technologies and 
societies more widely are held as pre-disposed to unfold in particular ways rather than others. Our 
ideas of the scope for human agency and social choice are thus reduced to restricted manoeuvrings 
under an essentially fixed set of imperatives. Whether we thrive or languish is seen to depend on how 
well we anticipate, pursue or adjust to this single inevitable course of development. Hence the 
resigned fatalism even among sceptics and critics of particular developments around the world, that 
‘you can’t stop progress’. 
 
In each of these contrasting aspects, notions of progress are deeply implicated in, and by, the 
exercise of power. Nowhere is this more true than in political debates over the standing of different 
forms of knowledge, the prioritisation of alternative kinds of innovation or the pursuit of contrasting 
development strategies. In all these areas, particular contestable values and interests are routinely 
protected from scrutiny by concealing them behind invocations of an apparently unitary and 
objective ‘way forward’. The effect is to assert the favoured vision at the expense of other possible 
values and directions for change. Once generally established as the supposedly uniquely possible 
path for progress, then a particular interest or normative position acquires the status of ontological 
inevitability. Herein lies the link between normative and ontological aspects of progress. The cloaking 
of evaluative ambiguities shades into the negation of substantive scope for choice, discussion and 
even thought.  
 
Of course, the particular values and interests that are most frequently embedded in such unitary 
notions of progress are those associated with incumbent institutions and privileged social groups. It 
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is these social actors who (by definition) disproportionately shape discourses of progress. Patterns of 
power in society may thus be seen not only as outcomes, but also as determinants of our 
understandings of progress. As a result, our imaginations of progress are – ironically – a principal 
factor conditioning the ways our progress actually unfolds. Though ostensibly imminent in the 
conditions encountered in our future possible paths, the determinants of progress are really 
following in our footsteps. Indeed, often unrecognised in our familiar surroundings and 
consciousness, the drivers of our progress are quite literally ‘breathing down our necks’. In 
contemplating the directions taken by our knowledges, technologies and societies, then, the 
challenge is therefore not so much to celebrate or criticise the details of what contingently emerges 
in the unfolding paths of knowledge, innovation or development. Open, inclusive, reflexive 
deliberation over alternative outcomes for progress is a crucial social faculty – and a necessary 
condition for any truly democratic polity. But contemplation of outcomes alone does not address the 
general underlying, recursively co-evolving links between disparate future potentialities and diverse 
current interests, imaginations, aspirations and expectations. The most vital and neglected 
responsibility is thus to engage directly with the underlying formative circularities themselves – the 
often invisible ways in which our normative commitments construct the actual directions of 
progress.  
 
The central argument of this paper is quite simply stated. Whether we are focusing on knowledge, 
innovation or development – and wherever we look in the world – the same basic dynamic recurs 
amidst the contrasts. Multiple – often radically different – orientations for change are typically 
feasible and viable. Different directions are favoured under divergent values and interests. Yet 
mainstream debate over choices between these possible paths tends to revert to polarised 
discussion around some single, ostensibly unitary, vision for progress. This is as true of Sustainability 
discourses as it is of preceding and parallel visions of progress. Often, the position is expressed as if 
there were ‘no alternatives’. The questions asked are thus typically restricted to ‘yes or no?’; ‘how 
much?’; ‘how fast?’ and ‘who leads?’ If we move instead to more plural understandings of progress, 
then the quality of debate – and of the ensuing choices – thereby stands to be enriched. Instead of 
fixating on some single contingently-privileged path, we might ask deeper, more balanced and 
searching questions about ‘which way?’; ‘what alternatives?’, ‘who says?’ and ‘why?’ This is the 
essence of a normative, analytic, epistemic, ontological – and consequently intrinsically political – 
project of ‘pluralising progress’. 
 
As one of a number of background papers for a ‘New Manifesto’ on innovation, sustainability and 
development, this paper will draw out some of the implications of these themes. This is an initiative 
of the UK Economic and Social Research Council Centre at the University of Sussex on Social, 
Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability (STEPS). Although the underlying issues 
are quite straightforward and highly practical in their everyday policy implications, some of the 
details are necessarily rather complex. Indeed, this is partly why they have remained so neglected in 
current mainstream academic and political debate. The issues are further obscured by the ways in 
which they are quite systematically occluded by the grain of conventional disciplinary thinking and 
policy language – concentrating as these do on the simple expediency of ‘one way’ narratives. In 
order to try to illuminate these crucial but hidden aspects, the discussion must therefore in places 
sometimes become quite technical. In order to try to help alleviate this, a short summary of the key 
argument is provided at the end. The paper will also use the straightforward device of focusing on 
three practical prescriptive implications for governance of innovation, sustainability and 
development: the ‘3D Agenda’. It is this agenda that provides a major element in the framework for 
the collectively-developed STEPS manifesto, with this paper consequently providing a key part of the 
analytical base. The three ‘D’s in question are those of the present title. Directionality refers to the 
need for more open academic and policy attention to the fact of there being alternative possible 
orientations for progress. Distribution refers to the imperatives for greater democratic agency, 
political accountability and social equity in shaping the drivers, benefits and vulnerabilities associated 
with alternative orientations. Diversity refers to the value of nurturing more plural discourses and 
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cultures around deliberate choice of portfolios of pathways for innovation, sustainable and 
development – allowing greater variety, dynamism and context-sensitivity in technological and 
institutional trajectories.  
 
The paper will develop these themes in a series of cumulative steps, each drawing out different 
implications that flow from the interlinked normative and ontological aspects of progress in modern 
societies discussed above. In the next section, we will explore some of the key contrasts and 
underlying commonalities between discourses about progress and more recent policy debates over 
Sustainability. The following section will examine how these contending normative issues relate to 
common ontological assertions concerning the inherent necessity of progress. Based on this, the 
subsequent section will review a broad multidisciplinary literature concerning the multiplicity of 
directions in technological progress – indentifying the many ways in which social choice gets 
‘closed down’ around a restricted subset of possibilities. Following this, discussion will turn to the 
implications that are raised for debates over the distributional challenges in social, institutional and 
technological development. The penultimate section of the paper will then argue for the importance 
of fostering greater diversity in the ways societies go about appraising – and pursuing – divergent 
trajectories in knowledge, innovation and development. In the concluding section, the key steps in 
the argument will be summarised and some wider reflections offered on the role of progress in the 
distinctive ‘origin myths’ of modern society.  
PROGRESS AND SUSTAINABILITY  
In normative terms, the issues entwined in contemporary ideas of progress are as old and deep as 
humanity. Progressive visions arise in many forms and eras, across a variety of cultures (Bury 1987). 
But the global stakes and rhetorics have intensified in the past couple of centuries. In this period, the 
passage of history has built a powerful worldwide hegemony around some highly specific and 
idiosyncratic ideologies of progress (Almond et al 1981). Conventionally traced to the European 
‘Enlightenment’, many of the constitutive values are actually rooted far before (Nisbet 1994) and 
beyond (Needham 1959) this setting. Vocabularies remain varied and hotly contested (Wessels 
2006). The actualities are even more so (Burgess 1994). But wherever we look in the world, we find 
mainstream notions of progress that are circumscribed in quite similar terms (Santayana 1998; 
Simon 1995). One key strand concerns ambitions to ‘advance’ our understanding of the world 
through contrasting conceptions of ‘reason’, ‘rationality’ and ‘science’ (Laudan 1977). Another 
centres on the aim of intervening in Nature through application of material, processual and 
organisational technologies – and so helping to ameliorate different kinds of human frailty and 
vulnerability and enhance human potential (Mokyr 1992). A third highlights variously understood 
versions of ‘democracy’, ‘emancipation’, ‘empowerment’ or ‘accountability’ as general imperatives in 
political life (Nelson 2006).  
 
There can be no doubt about the many benefits that can arise from sincere and active pursuit of 
these broad evaluative frameworks for progress. But immediate questions are raised at the outset. 
How are we to interpret such general aspirations? Which styles of rationality are to be upheld as a 
template for progress, exercised by whom and under which precepts and constraints (Hollis and 
Lukes 1982)? Which knowledges and disciplines are to count as progress in ‘science’ and which not 
(and to which extents) (Jasanoff 2005)? What kinds of technological interventions represent the best 
reflections of progress? To what extent is progress about technological artefacts and to what extent 
does it implicate social relations, institutional structures and cultural perspectives? Either way, does 
progress tend to lie in interventions that aim to control Nature, or in more subtle and effective 
means to respond to complexity and irreducible vulnerability? And what exactly is meant by progress 
in democracy or social justice? With such varied and dynamic patterns of contending values and 
interests in modern plural societies, what is to count as the single most unequivocally ‘progressive’ 
path for social change? Which particular instruments, procedures and institutions offer the most 
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progressive ways to achieve greater empowerment or accountability? As with any such broad 
ambitions – and even for this single apparently quite specific mainstream ‘Enlightenment’ 
understanding of progress – the proverbial devil is in the detail.  
 
Of course, none of this is to say that ‘anything goes’ in what counts as progress. Evaluative 
frameworks are not entirely open-ended. For instance, across diverse knowledges, there is a widely-
held intrinsic value to advancing our understandings of the world. Whether or not recognised as 
‘scientific’, most agree that improvements in knowledges and social learning can help significantly to 
enhance human wellbeing. Many have experienced how exercise of ever more subtle forms of 
intervention (through both social practices and material technology) can protect, expand and enrich 
particular areas of life.  It is clear that diverse forms of democracy and empowerment can massively 
amplify these benefits – and render them more equally distributed. Examples of the potential for 
these ambitions abound in areas like food, health, shelter, energy, environment, education, welfare, 
materials, mobility and communication. In all these areas and others, the life experience of many in 
the world now would be unrecognisable only a few generations ago. In a world in which one and a 
half billion people are living ‘without sufficient means for human survival’ (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 
Parsons 2008), where the privileged few dominate a disadvantaged majority and at a time when gaps 
between rich and poor continue to widen, there can be no doubt about the moral and political 
imperatives to further realise the potential of these broad normativities of ‘progress’.  
 
Yet nonetheless, there exists much debate over the deeper, more general and more nuanced 
normative implications of current notions of progress. In what senses, under which perspectives and 
in what contexts should we view particular emerging pathways or outcomes as good or bad? To what 
extent can professed commitments to these kinds of progress actually be taken at face value? 
Whether through misfortune, myopia or mendacity, declarations of ostensibly progressive aims have 
all-too-often remained tragically unfulfilled. ‘Advance’ in particular kinds of knowledge has often 
occurred at the expense of reversals – or deliberate suppression – of others. Apparently enlightened 
advocacy of ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’ has frequently reduced to unreflective imposition of doctrine. 
What counts as authoritative knowledge is often as much a reflection of institutional power as it is of 
robust or comprehensive understanding. Interventions aimed at control on the part of some may 
inherently prompt alienation or vulnerability on the part of others. And experience also shows how 
attempts to exercise social or technological control at one level can yield a host of unpredicted and 
uncontrollable threats at another. Perhaps most pressingly on this last issue, the result is a series of 
potentially existential global catastrophes, including: climate change, world famine, resource 
depletion, biodiversity loss, environmental pollution, novel pandemics and mass-destructive 
weapons. And even advocacy of ‘democracy’ itself is notoriously open to instrumental manipulation 
and dissonant outcomes (Chomsky 1996). In practice, history shows how prominence of this rhetoric 
is often accompanied by the compounding of various kinds of inequality, exploitation and even 
repression (Klein 2008). Despite apparently self-evident positive connotations, then, there can be no 
automatic, unqualified or unquestionable license for currently mainstream normative notions of 
progress.  
 
Of course, the particular values discussed thus far represent only one possible family of values 
associated with currently hegemonic ‘Enlightenment’ notions of progress. Around the world, there 
exist many other divergent ways to characterise nominally progressive ideologies. In many particular 
areas of political discourse, these are each variously taken as constitutive of a range of more explicit 
and specific ideologies of progress. These come in diverse political flavours. For instance, broadly 
‘conservative’ understandings of progress variously emphasise values characterised as individual 
autonomy, ‘free markets’, competitive behaviours, a reduction of the state, incentives rewarding 
‘success’ and the ‘trickle down’ of wealth (Goklany 2007). Depending strongly on the context, diverse 
‘social democratic’ perspectives on progress highlight issues such as equality of opportunity and 
equity of outcome (whether defined in terms of race, culture, gender, caste, class or sexuality), as 
well as social justice, reduction of poverty and vulnerability, welfare provision, cooperative 
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institutions and nonviolence in global affairs (Jameson 1999). Many permutations play out on these 
themes, including additional values associated with various forms of national or cultural self-
expression, religious freedom or particular doctrinal commitments. In recent decades, diversely 
construed environmental values form an increasingly important further array of ways for evaluating 
progress (Christoff 1995). The essential point is that each of these interpenetrating value systems 
may be taken to define radically divergent orientations for social, economic or technological 
progress. Against this rich kaleidoscope of commitments, the persistence of an apparently single 
unitary mainstream normative understanding of progress looks increasingly untenable (Herrigel 
2000).  
 
Over the past quarter century, global governance discourses have seen the emergence of a new and 
significantly more explicit and transparent arena within which to engage with these contending 
normativities in the defining of progress. This centres on the advent of ‘Sustainability’ and 
‘Sustainable Development’ as leitmotifs for ostensibly globally-shared values in production of 
knowledge, fostering of innovation and pursuit of development (UN 1992). Of course, it is a notorious 
feature of most mainstream policy discussions in these areas that ‘Sustainability’ can also remain 
tantalysingly ambigous with respect to exactly what is implied (Dobson 1996). As with other 
normativities of progress, the devil is in the detail. Indeed it is this quality of interpretive flexibility that 
forms a key part of the reason for the prominence of the language of Sustainability (Bijker 1995). And 
there is much active contestation between alternative formulations of ‘Sustainability’ and 
‘Sustainable Development’ – and between contending understandings of each (Meadowcroft et al 
1996). Nonetheless, the seminal formulation of the 1987 international Brundtland Commission 
introduced a degree of explicit normative focus that is unprecedented and without parallel in wider 
and older ‘Enlightenment’ understandings of progress (Murcott 1997). The canonical encapsulation 
of this position, is the injunction that policy should aim at ‘meeting the needs of the present, without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987).  
 
Although the progressive novelty of this principle is often characterised as resting on the attention to 
‘future generations’, the emphatic requirement that the needs of the present also be met was (and 
is), if anything, even more immediately radical. In subsequent elaborations on this theme, the 
essential thrust of Sustainability concepts in formal international governance debates consistently 
rests on three broad sets of broad normative values – each addressing different forms and contexts 
for human needs (UN 1992). The first concerns human wellbeing – including health, education and 
community coherence as well as economic development (MDD 2000). The second relates to social 
equity – across diverse groupings of people among both present and future generations (UN 2002). 
The third refers to environmental integrity – in terms of various forms of ambient pollution, 
ecological integrity and resource availability (UNEP 1997). It is in these ways that ‘Sustainability’ has, 
for the last two decades, been the principal global policy discourse enjoining the reversal of 
persistent maldistributions of privilege, appropriation and vulnerability affecting a large proportion of 
the world’s population.  
 
Having said this, it has to be acknowledged that the term sustainability is also often used in 
mainstream policy debates in much more instrumental ways. These threaten seriously to obscure 
and undermine this new and potentially significant form of normative specificity. Here there is a 
particular expediency, in that the broad colloquial meaning of the term ‘sustainability’ (in English as in 
other languages), refers generally to the maintaining over indefinite periods of any unspecified 
features, qualities or functions (OED 1989). This provides a linguistic license for legitimatory usages 
of this vocabulary – even in discourses concerned with the central human and environment 
problems of Sustainability – in ways that are inattentive, ignorant or actually potentially undermining 
of these same values. For clarity, this paper therefore refers to general colloquial meanings with a 
lower case ‘s’ and the more specific policy-related ‘Brundtland’ meanings with a capital ‘S’ (Stirling 
2009a). This is like the conventional orthographic convention distinguishing general use of the 
adjective ‘conservative’ from the still broad but more specific category ‘Conservative’. For instance, in 
9 
 
the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe (CEC 2004), we read of the need to sustain the 
internal market (Art. III-130.4), member state economies (Art. III-179.3), and government financial 
positions (Art. III-198.1b) – as well as the distinctive qualities of Sustainability (human wellbeing, 
social equity and environmental integrity) mentioned much later (Art. III-292d). In the commercial 
world, we hear routinely of ‘sustainable business’ in a fashion that emphasises not the human, social 
and environmental values of Sustainability, but factors that may be strongly in tension with these, 
like ‘profitability, competitiveness and market share’ (SBI 2005). In UK government discussions, the 
term ‘sustainable communities’ is likewise deployed in a fashion that reduces the entire 
environmental agenda to just one of nine mainstream policy aims – on a par with ‘good transport 
services’ (DCLG 2005).  
 
Given its environmental remit, the UK environment ministry, DEFRA, provides a particularly revealing 
example of the potentially perverse outcomes that can arise from these nonspecific and 
instrumental usages of the terminology of sustainability. Despite undoubted commitment and effort 
in pursuit of Sustainability in the Brundtland sense, the high-level organizational structure of this 
department has nonetheless long made prominent reference to sustainability in a fashion that 
contradicts its own detailed indicators (DEFRA 2004). All agricultural activities, for instance, have 
been routinely referred to in undifferentiated ways as ‘sustainable farming’ – implicitly neglecting to 
recognise any form of farming extant in the UK as being in any way ‘unSustainable’ (Stirling 2005). 
Likewise, DEFRA agencies employ the term ‘sustainable science’ to include areas of research 
concerned with the use of pesticides in agriculture (DEFRA 2002), despite the fact that reducing 
pesticide use features strongly among DEFRA’s own formal Sustainability indicators (DEFRA 2004). In 
effect, in these kinds of discourses, DEFRA (like many other institutions) is representing as 
sustainable, practices that they elsewhere acknowledge to be unSustainable. 
 
These kinds of dynamics in political discourse reproduce for the term sustainability many of the 
features already discussed in relation to the language of progress. Nor is this phenomenon new, or 
restricted to these debates alone (Gramsci 2000). This general form of rhetoric is a widespread and 
well documented means to ‘manufacture consent’ (Chomsky 2002). Multidimensional meanings are 
reduced. Normativities are concealed. Ambiguities are harnessed to expedient ends. Selected 
subjectivities are invested with ostensibly unitary objective status. Already-privileged values and 
interests are further reinforced. Yet despite these familiar pathologies, the elevation of sustainability 
discourses to the highest levels of contemporary politics nonetheless represents a significant 
development. Arguably for the first time since the Enlightenment, mainstream normatively-sanitised 
notions of progress are subject to calibration under a comparably hegemonic framework. As a result, 
policy debates are engaging (at least discursively) with progress not simply as the contingent 
emergent outcome of the evolution of incumbent institutions and markets. Instead, Sustainability 
discourses, despite their imperfections, are helping to illuminate the essential plural, rather than 
unitary, nature of progress. In place of a single inevitable trajectory, we begin to perceive a 
multiplicity of potential pathways – and thus a role for explicit evaluation, active politics and 
deliberate social choice (Leach et al, forthcoming).  
PROGRESS AND NECESSITY  
Despite the emergence around Sustainability of more explicitly normative policy discourses within 
which to evaluate progress in knowledge, innovation and development, mainstream representations 
of progress continue to remain restricted, opaque, ambiguous and deterministic. Across the world, 
elite political figures repeatedly couch progress in essentially technological terms. National leaders 
routinely defer in justifying decision making to the supposedly determining role of ‘sound science’ 
(Blair 2003; Busquin 2003) or ‘advanced technology’ (ATP 2007) – without specifying criteria of 
‘soundness’ or ‘advance’. There is similarly high-level support for the asserted self-evident benefits of 
undifferentiated ‘pro-innovation’ policies (Brown 2004; European Parliament 2006) – without 
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discussing which specific innovations are being referred to. Quite specific public misgivings over 
particular technologies are stigmatised as indiscriminate ‘anti-science’ (EU EGST 2004) or ‘anti-
technology’ anxieties (UK Council on Science and Technology 2000). In areas like GM crops or 
nuclear power, leading scientific figures repeatedly assert quite explicitly that there is ‘no alternative’ 
(King 2006).  
 
Although many of these leading figures are somewhat coy about elaborating on the thinking behind 
these statements, others are more helpfully forthcoming. The uni-directional technological 
determinism underlying so much of this elite thinking on progress was particularly well expressed in 
recent years by the President of the British Royal Academy of Engineering, in the globally-broadcast 
and widely-cited BBC Reith Lectures. Here, history is portrayed as a one-track ‘race to advance 
technology’ with the challenge of government being simply ‘to strive to stay in the race’. Looking 
forward, we are told quite explicitly that it is technology that ‘will determine the future of the human 
race’ – rather than the other way around. This is a strikingly literal notion of the human race! In it, 
incumbent patterns of technology change are seen as self-evidently good, with the role of ‘the 
public’ being simply to ‘recognise … and give [technology] the profile and status it deserves’ (Broers 
2005). It is interesting how often the purported Enlightenment values of objectivity and reason can, 
in attempts to defend this kind of vision, so often become overtly emotive and partisan. Senior 
politicians routinely treat dissent over particular favoured directions for technological change not as 
legitimate evaluative positions, but in animated language as ‘prejudice’ (Wicks 2005) and ‘unreason’ 
(Taverne 2005). Indeed, to a recent UN Deputy Director-General, criticisms of incumbent 
technologies like GM foods are attributable to indiscriminately ‘anti-technology protestors’, 
described rather breathlessly as ‘members of the “flat earth society”, opposed to modern economics, 
modern technology, modern science, modern life itself’ (Malloch-Brown 2001).  
 
These kinds of mainstream elite representations of progress and its supposed enemies can be 
recognised the world over. Again and again, they display all the strategic expediencies with which this 
paper began. They obscure – or explicitly reject – the legitimacy of evaluative positions that 
discriminate between different applications of knowledge, priorities for innovation or directions for 
development. Beyond this, the effect is implicitly to deny even the relevance of normativity in 
considering matters of progress. In any given area of socio-technological change, particular sets of 
incumbent values and interests are dressed up in the ostensibly irrefutable ontology of one-
directional progress. Science, technology and development are seen in any given context to be 
‘hard-wired’ for a single possible pathway for change (Sarewitz 1996). This unitary ‘way forward’ is 
presented as self-evident and pre-ordained (EU 2006). Where choices appear dimly at the edges of 
the favoured course, the response is that ‘there is no alternative’ (King 2006). Where there are doubts 
over the committed direction for advance, the resounding chorus is, that ‘you can’t stop progress’ 
(Gray 1999). All we have left, is an intrinsically tautologous and self-referential circularity, in which 
whatever happens to emerge from established structures of power and privilege in science, 
technology and development – will simply be asserted by these same interests as constituting 
‘progress’ (Noble 1993). It is in this way that dominant discourses in knowledge production, 
innovation priorities and social change effectively take a Panglossian form, in which all that actually 
occurs is for the best ‘in the best of all possible worlds’ (Voltaire 1759). 
 
To be fair, expedient elite discourses are not the only influence conditioning this monolithic 
hegemonic understanding of progress. Around the world there is much in wider everyday experience 
that seems to encourage similarly linear, deterministic views. If not strictly singular, the 
dimensionalities of global social and technological developments do appear severely constrained. 
Despite the many differences of experience between regions, classes, cultures, economies, 
ideologies and geopolitical settings, similar attributes repeatedly come to the fore in committed 
patterns of global change. Selected examples illustrate the general picture. In most countries, 
populations continue to grow. People are moving from the country to the city. Farms are becoming 
larger, employing fewer people and growing more dependent on external inputs. Diets are becoming 
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progressively more dependent on animal products and processed food. Craft skills are increasingly 
substituted by automated mass production. Transportation systems based on the private 
automobile are rapidly eclipsing other modes and systems. Energy use is rising inexorably. Electricity 
systems, in particular, are expanding as fast as infrastructures can be built.  
 
And many consequences of these developments also show more specific resonances. Mobile phone 
use is increasing radically worldwide, transforming social and economic relations in unexpected ways 
as this occurs. Information technology is penetrating ever more areas of life, fostering further 
systematic changes in the ways organisational challenges are analysed, managed and 
communicated. Exponential growth of the world-wide-web is associated with pervasive structural 
changes in politics, media and the arts. Despite reversals, national economies increasingly 
emphasise liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and reliance on commercial enterprise for public 
services. Global finance, businesses and supply chains are increasingly interconnected and co-
ordinated. In knowledge production, there is an ever-increasing proliferation of technical specialisms 
– with correspondingly greater reliance on institutionalised forms of expertise in every area of life. A 
series of industrially-driven environmental problems are increasingly familiar worldwide – from 
climate change, through urban smogs and chemical pollution to water scarcity, waste management, 
soil depletion and deforestation. Novel pathogens seem to emerge with increasing frequency. In 
individual countries across the globe there are ever-increasing gaps between the income and life 
experience of the rich and poor. 
 
Everywhere then, and in all these dimensions, the grain of contemporary developments seems often 
to run in broadly similar directions. The overall story is one of growth, concentration and 
acceleration, with parallel themes of erosion, alienation and inequality (ETC 2003). There are, of 
course, significant periods of interruption in these trends and important instances of turbulence. But 
these may be recognised as specific exceptions that underscore the general rule. Powerful eddy 
currents will always drag against a dominant flow. The point is that as time goes by around the world 
large scale changes in the ways we live, eat, see, hear, move, work, think and dream all seem 
increasingly to tell the same kinds of story.  
 
How might we come to understand this? Impressive bodies of integrative historical analysis point at 
consistent patterns underlying long-run co-evolution of cultures, institutions and technology in the 
period since the advent of global colonisation and the first industrial revolution (Freeman and Louca 
2002). Despite the enormous contextual contrasts, certain general features can be resolved.  One 
tradition of analysis bearing directly on this issue of interlinked patterns in long term global social 
and technology change, for instance, discerns large-scale secular cycles, each of around half a 
century or a little more in duration (Schumpeter 1939; Kuznets 1940; Kondratief 1979). In this view, 
successive waves of intensely interacting social and technological innovations create new ‘techno-
economic paradigms’ (Perez 1983) or ‘socio-technical landscapes’ (Elzen et al 2005). Eventually 
pervading the entire world economy, each is conceived as a process of ‘creative destruction’ 
(Schumpeter 1934; Abernathy and Clark 1985), involving episodes of explosive growth and structural 
change followed by a period of re-adjustment and dissemination. In its formative stages, each new 
phase of development is influenced, among other things, by incumbent interests and power 
dynamics acting in the preceding phase (Freeman and Perez 2000). In such ways, each wave is then 
held in turn to exert conditioning pressures on the orientations of consequent change.  
 
One especially forensic and well-articulated analysis of this kind is quite explicitly global in its scope. 
An essential motor driving these dynamics is found in the complementary but contending 
characteristics of financial and production capital (Perez 2003). Each successive cycle in techno-
economic progress is thus seen to involve the complex interplay of synergies and tensions between 
the two. In the industrial revolution that began in the UK in the late eighteenth century, for instance, 
a surge in availability of finance capital helped build pioneering infrastructures around machines, 
factories and canals. As this configuration of mutually-reinforcing production patterns was 
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disseminated and consolidated around the world, a new wave became evident. Initially often resisted 
by the entrenched structural interests arising in the first wave, this again began in the UK in the early 
nineteenth century. At this time, pressures of financial capital drove interlinked investments in 
steam, coal, iron and railways. As these forms of production capital then spread in their turn, the 
genesis of successive waves spread to the USA and Germany in the late nineteenth century, with the 
emergence of steel and heavy (electrical, chemical and civil) engineering. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, developments were driven principally from the USA: fuelled by the rise of the 
automobile and associated industries around oil, petrochemicals and mass production. Then, in the 
final third of the twentieth century, there emerged (again initially in the USA) a fifth wave around 
information technology and telecommunications. Looking forward, protagonists of this position 
foresee an imminent new global cycle of change, this time more geographically extensive in its 
inception and probably revolving around biotechnology, bioelectronics and nanotechnology 
(Linstone 2002) – possibly conditioned by Sustainability imperatives (Green et al 2002). Analysts 
associate these successive waves of formative creativity and destruction with pervasive shifts not 
only in industrial and economic infrastructures, but also in the character of wider knowledge 
production, institutional organisation and even cultural expression. So it seems there emerges in at 
least one well-considered and substantiated view an apparently quite unitary nature to the staging of 
large-scale long-run human progress. 
 
Of course, these kinds of synoptic generalisations give rise to as many questions as they answer. 
Criticisms are raised over crucial details. Queries are posed over comparabilities across contexts. 
Scepticism is expressed over apparently determinist implications. The point is, however, that it is 
these kinds of long-term historical analyses of social and technological change that offer the most 
obvious reference point in seeking to understand the apparent uniformities in the worldwide 
unfolding of progress. Given the apparent endorsement for notions of a discrete and unitary 
orientation to progress, it is therefore worth considering some of the implications of this analysis in a 
little more detail. Any insights arising from this sophisticated body of enquiry are likely to be highly 
relevant to the more rudimentary rhetorics of ‘no alternatives’ and ‘ways forward’. 
 
The first point is that it is not correct to interpret this idea of long-term emergent globally-extensive 
‘waves’ of change as necessarily constituting a more general ontology of one-directional 
technologically-determined human progress. Many of the principal authorities in this field are explicit 
and unequivocal about ‘the wide space of the possible’ in the substantive unfolding of any given 
phase – extending even to radically contrasting political-economies as well as divergent 
technological configurations (Perez 2004:236). This point is reinforced by considering biological 
evolution. The documenting of an iterative process in which periods of structurally stable equilibrium 
are punctuated by episodes of radical change is held in common between biological and techno-
economic evolution (Loch and Huberman 1999). In the story of life on Earth, for instance, the 
recognition of this kind of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in evolutionary dynamics in no way implies the 
determination of specific directions of change (Gould 2007). This is simply a feature of the process 
rather than the direction of change. Another contrasting trajectory of development under different 
contexts might also display similar patterns of creative destruction and consolidation – and even 
apparently similar regular periodicities – and yet unfold substantively in quite different ways (Gould 
1997). 
 
Likewise, repeated general structural associations and consistent patterns of causation need in no 
way imply that the substance of social or technological development is somehow pre-ordained. 
Financial capital and production capital (for instance) may interact in quite determinate ways, but the 
substantive consequences for the configuration of technologies may still remain at least partly 
contingent (Perez 2003). And suggestions that globalising processes of industrialisation seem to 
have unfolded in a broadly coherent fashion across the world, do not necessarily imply that this 
particular course of events was the only one possible. Prior to global integration through networks of 
colonisation and transoceanic trade, the shape of evolving human civilisations followed markedly 
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distinct patterns in different regions (Clark 1977; Chazan 2007). At a more detailed level in the next 
section there follows a review of the scope for counterfactual interpretations, in which many 
important features of more recent socio-technical trajectories can quite readily be seen to be 
subject to a multiplicity of contingent paths (Bunzl 2004). With essentially global processes such as 
colonialism or industrialisation – just like global climate or ocean ecosystems – the unfolding of a 
particular contingent path in no way of itself necessarily demonstrates that this particular path was 
inevitable (Hawthorn 1991; Ferguson 1998). In order to determine the relative importance of 
contingency and determinism in interconnected global systems like those around contemporary 
patterns of progress in human knowledges, innovation and development we need many such 
systems to consider (Morgan and Winship 2007). At the moment, the size of our sample of worlds is 
just one. 
 
Of course, just as in Nature, there exist certain asymmetries in the evolution of knowledge, 
technology and society (Gould 1988a). The sequencing of configurations is not always contingent, 
but may often be necessary (Sahal 1985; Carroll 2001). It would be difficult, for instance, for a frontal 
cortex to develop in the absence of a central nervous system. The emergence of opposable digits 
presupposes the evolution of limbs (Gould 1980). Just so, it is impossible realistically to envisage 
creation of titanium alloys before the smelting of more readily melted copper. Likewise, it would be 
difficult to build electronic computers before the advent of electric circuits (Dosi 1982).  
 
Development of many pharmaceutically-purified products like aspirin have only been possible 
through accumulated learning by sophisticated vernacular medicine based on in-depth experience 
of the properties of indigenous plants (Rist and Dahdouh-Guebas 2006). Yet even where they exist 
such necessities in the sequencing of particular configurations hold no necessary connotations of 
one-directional development. In technical terms they imply time asymmetry, but not single-path (or 
‘unicursal’) progress. In more familiar terms the structures of wasp, fly and bee all follow from 
common antecedents. Yet these shared past stages of change did not determine the future 
pathways. And the realised forms of wasp, fly and bee represent just a tiny subset of the diverse 
possible configurations that might – under different contexts – have constituted feasible and viable 
branching evolutionary paths (Gould 1988b). So too, then, might contrasting assemblages of 
knowledges, technologies and institutions share common origins, yet display the potential for 
further evolution in quite radically different directions – each one of which constituting a feasible, 
viable and legitimate orientation for progress.  
 
In conclusion to this discussion of progress and necessity, the basic message is clear. Persistent 
mainstream representations of human progress as technologically-determined, one-directional and 
essentially inevitable can find no necessary support in serious long-run historical analysis. The 
picture instead is much more nuanced. There are possible patterns in the dynamics of change. Not 
all developmental paths are equally likely. Some seem plain impossible. There are asymmetries in 
which kinds of configuration can precede others in time. But regularities that do emerge fall very far 
short of demonstrating a single possible pathway. There is nothing in this wide literature to refute 
that human processes of progress are as plural, rich and diverse as those displayed more widely by 
life itself. Somehow then, a multiplicity of potential pathways is reduced in order to arrive at the 
much more seriously restricted subset of trajectories that are actually realised. As we have seen, it 
may be that ‘no alternatives’ political rhetorics play a role here. But it would be unwise to jump to the 
conclusion that such substantive and extensive consequences are purely a result of discursive style.  
If not discourse alone, then, what other mechanisms are in play?  There exists an overwhelming body 
of evidence for the drivers of constrained directionality in the unfolding of knowledge, innovation 
and development. It is to this subject that attention will now turn. 
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DIRECTIONS IN PROGRESS 
Given the emphasis on ‘sound science’ and ‘evidence based’ positions in so much policy making on 
science and technology, it is interesting to consider how consistent with these principles is the 
central feature of mainstream discourse in this area. How well-substantiated is the ‘unicursal model’ 
(the ‘one track’, ‘no alternatives’, ‘way forward’, ‘race to the future’ concept of progress)? Discussion 
in the previous section showed how the manifest regularities in contemporary and historic social 
choices of technology are as consistent with a role for contingency and the conditioning effects of 
power as they are with any presumed ontological necessities. Yet, if the underlying potentialities of 
progress are truly plural, how exactly is it that they can be so readily reduced to such apparently 
unitary choices?  
 
As in any area of academic life, there exists a plethora of different disciplines and sub-disciplines 
concerned with this issue – generating an even greater multiplicity of voices. Boundaries are 
jealously guarded and vocabularies zealously policed. In comparing perspectives from history, 
philosophy, sociology and politics, as well as all the various tribes of economists (for instance, 
neoclassical, evolutionary, institutional and ecological), there seems at first sight a bewildering 
diversity of interpretations and commitments. Yet when it comes to the basic answer to the question 
posed here, a remarkable degree of consensus develops. All these disciplines in different ways have 
arrived at understandings that technologies may – like biological species – evolve in a variety of 
alternative directions (Ziman 2000). Not all directions are intrinsically feasible or contextually viable 
(Freeman and Soete 1997; Perez 2003). Yet at any given point (for any specific artefact, as for entire 
infrastructures), there are typically a number of contrasting trajectories along which developments 
may progress (Dosi and Labini 2007). At each stage, various social, institutional, cultural and political 
mechanisms act to build highly selective social commitments that realise the actuality of only a 
restricted subset of these diverging potentialities (Williams and Edge 1996). As evolution unfolds, 
then, so pathways emerging earlier are ‘closed down’, but other possibilities are ‘opened up’ (Stirling 
2008a). In this way, whether deliberately, blindly or unconsciously, societies ‘choose’ certain possible 
orientations for technological change rather than others (Collingridge 1983).  
 
Depending on the context, there exist many specific processes through which societies can be seen 
selectively to commit to certain technological pathways rather than others (Geels 2002). Complex 
historic contingencies play a crucial role (Mokyr 1992; Fleck 1993). In other words, part of the story is 
random chance. And the intrinsic material obduracy of technology is also always a factor (Hommels 
2005). But many systematic social mechanisms through which developments are ‘channelled’ in 
restricted subsets of the possible directions are also well documented (Kemp et al 1998; Elzen et al 
2005). For instance, where technological performance depends partly on patterns of adoption, then 
powerful positive feedback processes are created in conventional market dynamics. Though they 
may originate in essentially random patterns, these simple dynamics of market ‘lock in’ may become 
heavily directing of the course of change (Arthur 1989). The ubiquitous dysfunctionality of the 
QWERTY keyboard (David 1985) is an iconic example of the path-dependent consolidation of an 
initial purported accident of fate (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). Despite successive technological 
revolutions, the cumbersome exigencies of nineteenth century mechanical typewriter design persist 
in current – supposedly highly competitive – consumer product markets (David 2001). 
 
Similar mechanisms of path-dependency and lock-in may also serve to reinforce less arbitrary or 
politically innocent incipient patterns. The proximate social forces shaping early configurations of 
artefacts like bicycles (Bijker 1995), automobiles (Arthur 1994), road systems (Geels 2007), prisons 
(Foucault 1975), nuclear power (Cowan 1991), computer software (Church and Gandal 1992), 
chemicals production (Stringer and Johnson 2008), civil engineering (Winner 1977) and weapons 
systems (Kaldor 1981) can all be recognised typically to reflect the ‘needs’, preferences, 
normativities and interests of rather restricted social groups (Pool 1999). This is also true of the 
routines and practices (Nelson and Winter 1982) and paradigmatic ways of thinking (Dosi 1982; 
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Nelson 2008) extant in the most influential of successfully innovating organisations (Utterback 
1993). These also become imprinted in the resulting technologies and their subsequently 
institutionalised trajectories (von Tunzelmann et al 2008).  
 
More distributed pressures like those exerted by cultural expectations may also assert the 
sensibilities of relatively privileged social actors, such as entrepreneurs, investors, regulators and 
‘opinion formers’ (Brown and Michael 2003). Once established in these ways, socio-technical 
configurations can become techno-institutional ‘regimes’ (Rip and Kemp 1998), acquiring their own 
‘momentum’, at the expense of alternative (less privileged) configurations (Hughes 1983). These 
incumbent interests may then in turn come to exercise a degree of ‘autonomy’ (Winner 1977) in their 
capacity to condition their own ‘selection environments’ (Nelson 1993; Lundvall 1992), involving 
various kinds of ‘capture’ (Sabatier 1975) and ‘entrapment’ (Walker 2000) of ostensibly neutral, or 
even supposedly contending, social actors – like clients, regulators or legislators. Such is often 
observed to be the case in areas like nuclear infrastructures (Walker 1999), fossil fuels (Unruh 2000), 
automobile motoring (Geels 2007), industrial chemicals (Ashford 1994), genetic modification (van 
den Bergh and Holley 2002), cigarette manufacture (Kessler 2001), food additives (Millstone 1986), 
pharmaceuticals (Abraham 1995) and military systems (Kaldor 2007). 
 
The overall picture is overwhelmingly one of powerful socio-economic and institutional-political 
pressures constraining a much more open plurality of scientific and technological possibilities. The 
outcomes yielded in realised technological trajectories represent only a subset of the configurations 
that might have proven feasible or viable under other contingent social, cultural or political 
circumstances. Although the specifics in any given instance suffer from the serious methodological 
challenges of demonstrating the counterfactual (Lewis 2001), it is not necessary to validate 
conclusively some specific relationship between divergent conditions and alternative configurations, 
in order to substantiate the general principle that technological progress is better seen as a generally 
plural rather than unitary phenomenon. However, given the earlier discussion of the newly 
established normativities of progress arising in Sustainability debates, there arises one further 
question. What if the plural scope of possibility were further constrained by applying further shared 
normative selection criteria? To the extent that the broad shape of commitments concerning human 
wellbeing, social equity and environmental integrity are increasingly widely accepted, perhaps this 
emerging (ostensible) political common ground does impose a rather more restrictive influence on 
possible technological pathways than might otherwise be suggested? 
 
Perhaps the best way to respond to this query is to contemplate the particular challenge of global 
climate change. The imperative to reduce carbon emissions from energy use is one of the most 
specific, demanding and strongly consensual elements of wider Sustainability discourse (IPCC 2007). 
Emerging climate change mitigation policies are unique and unprecedented in the scale of current 
deliberate societal aims to influence the large-scale long-run nature of technological change (CEC 
2008). The formidable character of this test is accentuated by the fact that existing discussions of 
technology change in this field are especially prone to a ‘no alternatives’ rhetoric (King 2006). 
Scepticism over mismatches between existing government and established market trajectories 
amplifies the sense of scepticism over the scope for choice (Adam 2008). As a result, policy making 
for ‘transitions’ to a low carbon economy tends even more than in other areas to be treated simply as 
a matter of ‘management’, with associated choices and normativities implicitly self-evident and thus 
devoid of political content (Smith et al 2005). If it can be shown that even under the intrusive and 
demanding requirements of climate change mitigation there still exists a recognisable plurality of 
choices, then the thesis advanced in this section of the paper will be further reinforced. 
 
It implies no trivialisation of the monumental scale and urgency of the imperatives of climate 
change, to recognise that – in this area as in others – societies nonetheless still face real 
technological choices (Stirling 2008c). Even in the highly circumscribed area of electricity system 
strategies, there exists a multiplicity of technically feasible, potentially economically viable options, 
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each one of which might form the centrepiece for a system-wide transition. Major kinds of trajectory 
here include carbon capture and storage (IPCC 2005), a multitude of frameworks for demand 
efficiency and energy service innovations (Patterson 2009), alternative varieties of nuclear power 
(Craven and Rhodes 2003), centralised continent-scale renewable energy infrastructures (Scheer 
2004) or shifts towards a diversity of new distributed small-scale Sustainable energy resources (Wood 
2007) – permutations of each of which involve further infrastructure shifts to a ‘hydrogen economy’ 
(Holland and Provenzano 2007). A comprehensive and authoritative international comparative 
technology assessment literature is very clear that there exists a plurality of possible ‘low carbon’ 
pathways (World Energy Assessment 2000). Each path displays contrasting pros and cons, but all 
hold enormous potential for scale economies and learning-by-doing (Jacobsson and Johnson 2000).   
 
Interestingly, on the rare occasions when confronted with the manifest contradiction of the ‘no 
alternatives’ vision, protagonists of this rhetoric respond simply by asserting instead that ‘we should 
do everything’ (King 2007) – a similar defence of the status quo, but one more step removed. Of 
course any real world strategy must inevitably involve some diversity. The point is not that only one 
pathway will be pursued entirely to the exclusion of others, but that not all of these pathways can be 
fully realised together (Stirling 2009b). Despite the strong normative imperatives and formidable 
technical constraints, climate change policy remains a further arena within which the prospects for 
future progressive technology change is emphatically open and plural, rather than closed and one-
directional. 
 
The overwhelming picture then, is one of societies acting – variously deliberately, blindly and 
unconsciously – to ‘choose’ certain possible orientations for technological change rather than 
others. Given this, it is interesting that the multiple disciplines responsible in various ways for these 
insights have had so little success in countering the restricted, opaque, ambiguous and deterministic 
representations of technological progress in mainstream politics. Despite the evidence, established 
elite visions persist of a unitary ‘way forward’, yielding a ‘race to the future’ with ‘no alternatives’ 
(Leach and Scoones 2006). This is not simply due to the entrenched political expediencies discussed 
at the beginning of this paper. Even some of the most well-informed disciplines have themselves 
been curiously circumscribed in the clarity and volume with which they address the reduction of 
directionality in technology choice. Various branches of economics, for instance, are responsible for 
some of the most profound, elegant and far-reaching insights concerning technological 
directionality. Yet, when the economics of technology engages with policy making – and especially 
politics more widely – the picture seems to become somewhat attenuated.  
 
This point is best illustrated at a general level by considering the relative profiles of different areas of 
economic attention to technology change. A plethora of economic theories, methods and tools have 
been developed and exercised to explore a multitude of scalar properties in the analysis of 
technology change. For instance, there exist innumerable approaches to quantifying the magnitudes 
of various aspects of technological performance (Dayananda et al 2007). A central focus lies in 
techniques for deriving some optimal balance between contending pros and cons (Layard and 
Glaister 1994). Hosts of economists work on different ways to increase the rates at which innovation 
might proceed in different circumstances (Chakravorti 2001). One of the largest areas of activity 
concerns the efficiency with which organisations (firms, governments or regional agencies) may 
hope to foster innovation (Grupp 1997). A vibrant field of research centres on understanding 
regional, national or sectoral ‘innovation systems’ and ‘market structures’ in order to maximise the 
generic prospects for what remain largely-undifferentiated notions of innovation (Fagerberg et al 
2006). And large tracts of economic literature address specific challenges posed for policy makers in 
seeking to design instruments for encouraging ‘first movers’ (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988), 
‘catching up’ (Santangelo 2006), ‘forging ahead’ (Abramowitz 1986), ‘diffusion’ (Rogers and Rogers 
2003) ,‘leapfrogging’ (Brezis et al 1993) or more general ‘advance’ (Nelson and Nelson 2002) – or 
avoiding ‘barriers’ (Parente and Prescott 1994), ‘falling behind’ (Abramowitz 1986), or becoming 
‘laggards’ (Aghion et al 2006) or ‘stranded’ (Farrell and Saloner 1986) in some particular direction of 
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change that is presumed to be general. Crucially, all these high-profile concepts in the economics of 
innovation are consonant with the unicursal (one-directional ‘race’) rather than a plural model of 
technological progress. 
 
It is not the purpose here to denigrate the value of any of these bodies of analysis in their own right. 
What is striking, though, is that none of these dominant areas in the economics of technology fully 
address the intrinsically qualitative and political challenge posed in contemplating contending 
directions for change. This is not simply a matter of preference in economics for a quantitative over 
qualitative idiom, or technical over political problem-formulations. If this is the preference, then 
directionality may readily be quantified in technical terms as easily as can any of the above scalar 
attributes. The crucial difference is, instead, that the characterisation of innovation would then take 
the form of a vector rather than a scalar quantity. Unlike simple scalar numbers, vectors include the 
property of direction. In their plurality and relative indeterminacy, the resulting additional parameters 
of directionality make it far more difficult to assert a single, ostensibly uniquely objective ‘way 
forward’. This prompts many questions of the conventional thrust of mainstream economic 
approaches to technology change mentioned above. For whatever reason, it seems that – despite 
yielding many crucial insights concerning the directionality of technology and innovation more 
widely – much economics is in the habit of treating these phenomena overwhelmingly in scalar 
rather than vector terms. This in turn provides a significant and quite specific reinforcement of the 
expedient political rhetorics mentioned earlier, which reduce the politics of innovation simply to an 
impoverished matter of ‘yes or no?’; ‘how much?’; ‘how fast?’ and ‘who leads?’ The prospects for 
rigorous attention to questions like ‘which way?’; ‘what alternatives?’, ‘who says?’ and ‘why?’ are thus 
further eroded by the aggregate influence of an essentially scalar economics of technology.  
 
Although providing no concrete substantiation for current instrumental ‘one track’, ‘no alternatives’, 
‘way forward’, ‘race to the future’ rhetorics, it is in this way that much of the economics of technology 
currently acquiesces to this syndrome. The result is that political discourse engages with challenges 
in technology policy in ways that are entirely different to the manner in which we routinely debate 
other areas of policy. No matter how strategically expedient or highly-charged and polarised the 
polemics become in areas like criminal justice, education, public health or social welfare, it would in 
almost any political context be regarded as quite simply indefensible to accuse critics of some 
particular policy as being therefore generally ‘anti-policy’. Yet in policy discourse across the world, 
this is effectively the norm on questions of technology choice. As we have seen, scepticism over the 
merits of particular innovation trajectories (like genetically modified foods, nuclear power or 
incineration of chemical wastes) is routinely branded – in the strongest terms and at the highest 
political levels – as generally ‘anti-science’, ‘anti-technology’ or ‘anti-innovation’. The cumulative 
insights of economics, alongside virtually every other disciplinary understanding of technology and 
innovation, shows that this language is as nonsensical and disabling of critical debate as would be 
some hypothetical ‘anti-policy’ rhetoric. 
 
In closing this examination of the neglected importance of the property of direction in the analysis 
and politics of technology change, there is one further observation that might be made. The 
transparently impoverished and instrumental character of mainstream political discourse in this field 
– despite the evidence to the contrary – prompts a potentially fruitful hypothesis. This arises from an 
insight that is well-known in anthropology, to the effect that crucial features of idiosyncratic forms of 
reasoning are typically best appreciated from outside. In this vein, there does exist an interesting 
parallel for the representations displayed in attenuated mainstream notions of technology change. 
This lies in the ‘symbolic function’ sub-stage of ‘pre-operatory thought’ identified by psychologists in 
the early phases of child development from around the age of one to three (Piaget and Inhelder 
2000). The reduction of progress from a complex vector to a simple scalar is reminiscent of the 
restricted dimensionality in understanding of quantity conventionally associated with this style of 
thought. The investment of technology itself with its own effective agency seems also to parallel the 
animistic approach to inanimate objects documented in young children. The fixation of attention on 
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actuality (of emergent technological configurations) rather than potentiality (of realisable forms of 
innovation), also resonates with this way of thinking. Finally, the treatment of normativities as self-
evident rather than as a matter for reflection is also a familiar feature of ‘egocentric’ cognition in 
early years (Elkind 1976). It is in such ways, that further understanding of conventional elite 
narratives of technological progress might fruitfully itself be progressed by analytically comparing 
this mainstream discourse with ‘baby talk’. 
DIMENSIONS OF DISTRIBUTION  
It has been argued above that much academic and political discourse focuses disproportionately on 
the ‘scalar’ attributes of policy making on knowledge, innovation and development, such as the 
magnitude, rate, or efficiency with which instrumental outcomes are achieved, aggregate benefits 
realised or ‘leadership’ sustained. Yet there is one area of the literature that presents a notable 
exception, highlighting the importance of more complex distributional issues (Freeman and Soete 
1997).  This was a crucial focus of the ‘Sussex Manifesto’ in 1970 (Singer et al 1970; Ely and Bell 
2009). There now exists a considerable academic literature in this field (Ely and Bell 2009; Bell 2009). 
Important parts of the discipline of development studies are constructed around this theme as an 
ordering priority. Unlike the issue of directionality, questions of distribution resonate strongly with a 
major strand in mainstream ‘Enlightenment’ notions of progress, concerning professed aspirations 
to democracy, accountability, empowerment, equity and equality. It might be thought, therefore, 
that the acknowledgement of directionality in plural processes of progress will have relatively little 
new to offer to existing debates over distributional issues in knowledge, innovation and 
development. This is partly true. But there do remain some important areas where understandings of 
the salient issues may be deepened and extended. There are also some further potentially significant 
implications for the politics of science, technology and development. These will be the focus of the 
present section. 
 
It has already been discussed how concern for distributional inequalities is a theme common to both 
broad ‘Enlightenment’ notions of progress and more recent discourses around Sustainability. This 
dual prioritisation is reflected in the high discursive prominence routinely attached to this issue in 
statements from elite institutions and radical critics alike. To judge by official statements, there is 
ostensibly widespread formal acceptance at a global level that present patterns in the social 
distribution of the basic necessities for life, vital economic resources and wider cultural 
opportunities, are all manifestly unjust and intolerable. This is true within most countries of the world. 
Inequality remains the single most striking feature of our global societies taken as a whole. In 
seeking or professing to address these issues, however, conventional policy making on knowledge, 
innovation and development in both national and international contexts remains tightly 
circumscribed by existing patterns of power and privilege. The resulting tensions, dynamics, 
imperatives and opportunities are well explored in a voluminous literature. A particular challenge lies 
in moving away from an instrumental approach under which poverty is an ‘outcome’ to be 
‘managed’. More consistent with the ‘democratic’ tradition in various notions of progress and 
Sustainability, is that the responsibility to address poverty be seen more as a challenge of enabling 
political (self)-empowerment (Sen 1983). Either way, what is more relevant are the particular 
additional – and to many less familiar – dimensions of this responsibility that are added by 
acknowledging the plural nature of progress in knowledge, innovation and development. The 
arguments may best be outlined by focusing on the issues around technology. 
 
The dynamics of continuously branching processes of technology choice documented in the last 
section constitute two major distinctive sources of additional distributional challenges. Each 
presents a different face of what might collectively be termed ‘technological vulnerability’ (Bijker 
2006). The first is a social vulnerability to technology: people (and their environments and fellow 
beings) are perpetually vulnerable to the unforeseen, unintended, contested (and often intrinsically 
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indeterminate) consequences of their own technological commitments (Tenner 1997). The second 
vulnerability is the converse of the first: that of technology to society (Bijker 2006).  Entirely feasible 
and viable technological pathways are themselves vulnerable to being foreclosed, especially at their 
incipient stages, by circumstantially (or intentionally) contrary societal forces. It is disproportionately 
the particular pathways for knowledge production, technological innovation and social development 
favoured by the poorest and most marginal groups that tend to be most irrevocably occluded. Each 
of these twin vulnerabilities will here be considered in turn. 
 
In considering the vulnerability of people to technology, one key question arises right at the outset. 
What is so new about this? Is this not already obvious under conventional unitary understandings of 
progress – and variously well-addressed by conventional regulatory institutions? Even the most 
singular and deterministic visions of technology change acknowledge the importance of addressing 
adverse unintended effects. Examples might include issues associated with nuclear materials, toxic 
chemicals, iatrogenic disorders, urban congestion, alienating architecture, exclusive media, 
commodity crops, zoonotic diseases, processed foodstuffs, fossil fuels, intrusive surveillance, 
disabling security – and even more strongly, but often neglected weapons of mass destruction and 
offensive military hardware more generally. No matter how optimistically particular communities 
view the balances of benefits and harms for the associated technologies, each of these present 
prospects of severe negative impacts and seriously intractable uncertainties. And herein lies the 
crucial distinguishing feature between vulnerabilities as seen under conventional one-directional 
views of progress, and as appreciated under more plural understandings (Jasanoff 2005). The open-
ended, multiply-branching nature of socio-technical change raises entirely new dimensions of 
indeterminacy (Wynne 1992).  Where adverse ‘collateral’ effects are regarded as a necessary 
consequence of inevitable orientations for change, they become immutable conditions of existence. 
As exogenously determined imperatives, amelioration of such effects must be ‘managed’, but their 
very existence raises no particular issues of responsibility or accountability. Under the plural view, it is 
the possibilities of alternatives that render these kinds of exposures salient in relative terms as 
‘vulnerablities’. This in turn raises a distinctive and particularly pressing set of additional distributional 
issues. 
 
Of course, all change (whether unitary or plural in its potential paths) presents challenges of 
uncertainty and indeterminacy. These occur even in the case of entirely natural stress and shocks, 
where associated adversities can be assumed to be of a generic kind – indiscriminate in their effects 
and undirected by any sectional interest. However, as shown with tragic frequency in earthquakes, 
floods, droughts, hurricanes, landslips and epidemics (where human agency is not the driving factor 
and there exists – in principle – no differentiation between the circumstances of rich and poor), this 
does not prevent impacts falling most damagingly on the least affluent and most excluded of people. 
Marginalisation and disempowerment force lifestyles involving greater exposure even to natural 
hazards: through the places people live, what they must eat and the ways they have to work. Poverty 
also impairs adaptive capacity, resilience and robustness. These are as true of the consequences of 
uncertainty over technological risks as they are in the case of natural hazards. 
 
As in natural disasters, pre-existing social conditions of marginality and disappropriation exacerbate 
vulnerabilities to even the most general of the unforeseen, unintended and contested 
consequences of technological commitments. For instance, exposures to chemical pollution are 
often greatest among communities whose health is already adversely affected by poverty (Bryant 
1995; Bullard 2005). Toxic waste management excludes export to poorer countries (Clapp 2001). 
Subsistence farmers –especially women (Jacobs and Dinham 2003) – are often so constrained in 
time or resources that they are unable to follow recommended practices (Waichman et al 2007). 
Those employed in the lowest paid jobs often face the highest occupational risks (Dwyer 1991; 
Lowenson 1998). Migrant workers typically operate outside health and safety law (US NRC 2003). 
Product usage regulations fail to account for reuse or adaptation of the kind often practised by the 
poorest people – or indeed to conditions of use in childrens’ play (Faustman et al 2000). Those with 
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least resources have least capacity to avoid these kinds of harms, or remedy them where they occur. 
Where adverse effects of progress are regarded as inevitable but uncertain and ambiguous in their 
details, they present formidable problems of inequity. Where technology change is understood 
instead as plural and subject to social agency, the dimensions of distributional injustice are 
correspondingly compounded and expanded. 
 
Beyond these relatively well-established kinds of distributional issue, however, plural understandings 
of progress raise a further distinctive problem. This concerns the depth of indeterminacy (Wynne 
1992). As we move from unitary to plural understandings, the larger scale configuring of 
technologies (like those mentioned above) becomes a point at issue (Stirling 2003). The relatively 
confined domains of risk and uncertainty around particular incumbent trajectories are thus 
massively extended. This introduces additional dimensions of incertitude including deep ambiguities 
over the orientations of the possible pathways themselves, with associated ignorance over not only 
the associated probabilities and divergent framings but even the fundamental parameters of 
technological vulnerability (Stirling, 2008c). As discussed above, each additional dimension of 
incertitude impacts most acutely on those whose general circumstances lead them to be most 
exposed, or have least capacity to resist or adapt. The existing well-known dilemmas of risk and 
responsibility are thus yet further multiplied in the plural model.  
 
All these dilemmas apply irrespective of motivations. One still further dimension added by the plural 
model of progress, however, are additional questions of human intentionality, social agency and 
tractability to power. Like indeterminacy, this applies not just in the management of the 
implementation of technological change, but in the configuring of the technological trajectories 
themselves. The problem is that the subset of possible pathways to which commitments tend to be 
made also tend to be selected on the basis of the balance of benefits and impacts, not across society 
in general, but in relation to much more particular interests. To the extent that there is a zero-sum 
component in human affairs in which different social actors are at least partly in competition, this 
alone transforms the nature of the distributional challenge. But even under a more Panglossian view 
(Voltaire 1759), where social actors are never attributed incentives to harm the interests of another, 
this dimension of intentionality in the choice of trajectories for change further massively compounds 
the nature of the distributional challenges associated with progress.   
 
Here we face the second aspect of technological vulnerability: the vulnerability of technology to 
society. When moving from a unitary to a plural notion of progress, dimensionalities of vulnerability 
and inequity are significantly increased, with consequences that bear (again) disproportionately on 
the least powerful. It is not only the case that the poor are disproportionately vulnerable to 
technological choices primarily determined by the interests of the rich. It is the technological 
choices that might most favour the interests of the poor that are also themselves disproportionately 
curtailed. Viewing the evolutionary processes discussed in the last section as ‘landscapes’ of 
technological potential (Geels 2004), even quite subtle influences acting at ‘watersheds’ between 
developmental channels, can exert decisive effects on the direction of change (Waddington 1977). 
This presents the tantalising prospect that even apparently marginalised interests in the direction of 
technology change can – with luck and guile at favourable ‘windows of opportunity’ – entertain 
ambitions of being realisable. Yet this also brings its own challenges. Even at these watersheds, it is 
far from guaranteed that even the most concerted of social or political interventions will realise the 
intended ends. No matter how much more favourable some marginal branching channel may be 
agreed to be, it can rapidly become impossible to shift course once the formative moments have 
passed (Perez and Soete 1988).  
 
Examples of widely-supported pathways that are variously claimed to favour the interests of poorer 
groups, and that are vulnerable in this way include: village-scale distributed renewable energy; seed 
production for farmer selection; low-input strategies for Sustainable agriculture; preventive forms of 
healthcare; socialised public transport systems; community-supported vernacular architecture 
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(Smith 2007) or technologies enabling nonviolent security. Of course, this vulnerability of technology 
to society is a more normatively ambiguous distributional issue than vulnerability of people to 
technology, depending as it does on evaluative judgements of the technological trajectories in 
question (Noble 1993). The point here is not to assert the unqualified benefits for poorer groups of 
any of the particular pathways mentioned above. The aim is rather to illustrate the general 
implications of the present analysis. In each case the move from a unitary to a plural understanding 
of progress raises dual facets of a new dilemma. The very possibility of empowering trajectories 
compounds the inequities of the intrinsically social obstacles to their realisation.  
 
All this applies even where it is assumed that governance includes concerted and potentially 
effective efforts to articulate the interests of the poor in qualitative processes of pathway-creation 
and large-scale mechanisms of technology choice. Yet it is a pervasive feature of all the diverse 
understandings of plurality in technology choice reviewed in the last section, that it is usually the 
more proximate interests of the rich, privileged and powerful that tend to hold sway. Of course the 
very uncertainties, ambiguities and indeterminacies just discussed earlier mean that this may also 
often give rise to apparently dissonant outcomes. There is no necessary implication that privileged 
agency always yields more favourable outcomes for those who exercise it. Despite overwhelmingly 
positive health benefits of social privilege, for instance, there are many self-inflicted health disorders 
that are fostered by the technology and associated lifestyle choices of the rich. When distinguished 
from the nutritional vulnerabilities of the poor, a host of general dietary risks associated with modern 
processed food are more evident in high income than low income countries. Yet, even here, adverse 
effects fall disproportionately on those who are most marginalised within the more globally affluent 
populations (Wang and Lobstein 2006). It cannot be excluded that some of the consequences of 
these indeterminacies will serve to ameliorate maldistribution – or even improve aspects of social 
equity. But it would be eccentric to expect this as a general or systematic outcome. 
 
But the main dynamic in technology choice is rather different. It is not a politically partisan point to 
observe that deliberate pressures for empowerment or redistribution are not the dominant drivers in 
key areas of global innovation activity like military technology, aerospace, energy, information, 
communication, robotics, nanotechnology, pharmaceuticals or neuroscience. In these as in other 
areas, it would be problematic simply to assume that the formative pressures acting on technology 
choice will necessarily be democratically progressive. In the vast arena of military research and 
development, the forceful assertion of particular interests is too obvious to dwell on. The opportunity 
costs for other areas and directions of innovation remain seriously under-discussed in current 
innovation policy or analytical literatures in disciplines like economics. In the vast field of agricultural 
innovation, innovative effort likewise focuses almost exclusively on products asserting high degrees 
of copy-protection by rich producers against poor farmers, like genetically modified crops and 
advanced hybrid seeds. Alternatives trajectories around participatory farmer breeding programmes, 
low-input agriculture or organic farming, or even genetic marker-assisted selection, syngenics and 
apomixes, remain neglected.  
 
Likewise, worldwide patterns of innovation in public health tend disproportionately to emphasise 
intellectual property-intensive options like pharmaceuticals at the expenses of community- and 
lifestyle-based preventive care or organisational practices that may often be far more effective, but 
which do not allow the realising of property rents (Boldren and Levine 2008). Even in the area of 
pharmaceuticals, efforts focus disproportionately on addressing – and sometimes actively 
constructing through marketing – relatively benign health disorders of the rich, rather than tackling 
far more severe, widespread and (sometimes) readily remedied diseases of the poor (Doyal 2002). 
New areas of genetic medicine are similarly focusing on forms of ‘preventive’ intervention, that 
prioritise high revenues from large sub-populations that might be argued to be predisposed to some 
disorder, rather than the far smaller rewards from treating populations who actually contract them.  
In transport, innovation activity disproportionately focuses on the private automobile, rather than 
mass transit technologies or other public transport practices. Likewise, complex forms of motive 
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power are preferred – like petrol-electric hybrids – partly because this allows greater value for hard-
pressed manufacturers. In water systems, the internationally growing model of private sector 
provision is helping to reinforce innovation pathways highlighting prospects of short-term returns on 
higher value usage patterns. Innovations in areas like mass provision and water differentiation and 
recycling systems tend to be relatively neglected. All these dynamics tend to favour incumbent 
actors in innovation systems, potentially at the expense of more marginal innovators or even less 
empowered users. 
 
The overwhelming emphasis in energy innovation is likewise still concentrated on technologies 
rather than behaviours, practices and organisational reform that are in many cases uncontroversially 
acknowledged to be far more effective and efficient (Patterson 2009). Existing concentrations of 
interests mean that innovation is further prioritised in supply over frequently more efficient options 
on the demand side. And the particular technological pathways receiving greatest support tend to 
emphasise highly concentrated energy production of a kind that can most readily be appropriated 
and controlled by similarly concentrated institutional interests. It is in this way that large scale coal 
power and nuclear fission, and even far more distantly-realisable forms of nuclear fusion, continue to 
be privileged over small, distributed, modular technologies from which incumbent interests expect 
innovation benefits to be more difficult to appropriate. Likewise the complex, lengthy high-volume 
resource supply chains associated with nuclear and fossil fuels look preferable as a source of rent to 
supply companies, than the typically far shorter resource supply chains associated with renewable 
forms of energy. 
 
Each of these relatively well-known complexities in various sectors of technology policy raises 
profound distributional issues. The point illustrated here, is that the implications are significantly 
amplified as we move from unitary to plural understandings of technological progress. Alternative 
models for incentivising innovation – like the international funding of global prizes for progressive 
socially-determined ends – remain relatively marginal to existing governance of knowledge, 
innovation and development (Gallini and Scotchmer 2001). Instead, what attention there is to 
distributional challenges tends to focus, not so much on the detailed configuring of the directions 
taken by the trajectories themselves, but on (highy relevant, but relatively coarse-grain) distinctions 
between ‘big’ and ‘small’ or ‘high’ and ‘low’ technology (Schumacher 1998; Cozzens and Bobb 2003) 
or on even more restricted issues around the modalities for their respective implementation. In 
other words – and despite honourable exceptions – measures advocated to address injustice, reduce 
poverty or enhance livelihoods of marginal groups, all tend to be restricted to an essentially ‘tactical’ 
level, which presumes key features of overall strategic directions for knowledge, innovation or 
development – and seeks to mitigate impacts insofar as this is rendered possible under these driving 
assumptions. Much important wider work on distributional issues in economics, political science and 
development is of this kind, thus tending to neglect fundamental questions of direction in 
knowledge and innovation (Sen 2003; Fields 2003).  
 
In short, there arises from this account a series of successively more demanding dimensions in the 
distributional challenges posed in contemplating progress in knowledge, innovation and 
development. These may be summarised in stylised terms as follows. First, there is the conventional 
attitude that might be associated with current technocratic governance discourses reviewed earlier. 
This is broadly supported by conventional neoclassical economics, addressing distributional 
questions in terms of Pareto optimisation and the hypothetical recirculation of surplus: Only the 
direction favoured by dominant interests constitutes progress. Any apparent alternative would thus 
be inherently against progress. Overall benefits can be assumed to outweigh drawbacks. Finding the 
right distribution of these is largely a matter for incumbent institutions acting through existing 
markets. 
 
Second, there is a stylised view that is more sympathetic to the nature and importance of 
distributional challenges, but which retains an essentially unitary conception of socio-technical 
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progress. Various forms of this are characteristic of many of the more politically progressive areas in 
evolutionary, institutional and development economics: Let’s begin by defining progress as the 
specific direction favoured by a particular dominant view. But then, we need to ask whether (in terms 
that may be broader, but remain consonant with this view), overall dynamic benefits exceed 
drawbacks? If so, those seen to benefit might be held hypothetically to compensate those suffering 
drawbacks. This is then taken to justify proceeding in this direction. Only if this is not the case, might 
we explicitly consider alternative orientations. Deciding on this is an essentially technical matter for 
economics. 
 
Third, there is a stylised view that fully encompasses the implications of the plural model of progress 
outlined here. Should we progress in this, that or some other direction? In each case, what is the 
distribution of benefits and drawbacks for different groups and under contrasting views? Deciding on 
which direction presents the right balance is inherently a matter for responsible and accountable 
social choice through reflexive institutions and deliberate democratic politics. It is in the contrasts 
between this latter approach and the conventional progressive view identified immediately above, 
that we find the real significance of the plural understanding of progress for the distributional issues 
raised by innovation.  
ENABLING DIVERSITY 
This paper has made the case that moves from unitary to plural understandings of progress hold 
profound implications for governance of knowledge, innovation and development. An emphasis on 
scalar quantitative attributes of change (like ‘rate’, ‘timing’, ‘efficiency’, ‘benefits’ and ‘impacts’) can 
serve to suppress attention to crucial qualitative properties of directionality. It was argued in the last 
section that this adds significant but neglected dimensions to issues of distributional equity. One way 
of responding to these challenges is to diversify processes through which such social choices are 
informed. There exist a host of methods, practices and institutions that provide for a ‘broadening out’ 
of attention to diverse visions, issues, values, options, interests, priorities, uncertainties and 
perspectives in social appraisal of alternative trajectories for research, technology or development. In 
particular, there is a social justice imperative to ensure that these processes are as engaged with – 
and as sensitive and responsive as possible to – the interests and aspirations of the poorest and most 
marginal people. The analysis of distributional challenges in the last section amplifies this aspect, 
because the stakes are far higher than simply the modalities for implementing self-evidently optimal 
pathways of change. It is the actual directions of knowledge, innovation or development trajectories 
that are at issue. 
 
This challenge of diversifying and broadening-out social appraisal can be met in a number of ways. 
Most obviously, there are the much-discussed, but yet-to-be-established roles for more genuinely 
inclusive deliberative institutions (Dryzek 2002). Examples include various forms of participatory 
appraisal, consensus conferences, citizen’s juries, stakeholder commissions, scenario panels, 
extended foresight and backcasting workshops (Renn et al 1995). It is often observed that much of 
the apparently frenetic existing governance activity in these areas is largely motivated by 
instrumental pressures to justify and legitimate incumbent decision making processes and 
outcomes (Levidow 1999). Other instrumental rationales include the fostering of trust, the 
management of accountability and the hedging of blame (Hood 2002). The prominence of more 
ostensibly altruistic aspirations – to empower marginal groups or enhance the democratic nature of 
decision-making – is not always borne out in practice (Pimbert and Wakeford 2001).  
 
Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that these emerging new forms of engagement do represent an 
important and potentially progressive development. They offer a significant means to diversify and 
broaden out the basis on which social commitments are informed (Wynne 2002). Irrespective of the 
presently limited institutional traction, the burgeoning of these new approaches also has the effect 
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of fostering new normativities, aspirations and expectations concerning the role of wider social 
agency in knowledge production, innovation and development (Jasanoff 2007). Real progressive 
political pressures are still likely to be most effectively articulated in more spontaneous political 
mobilisation of social movements and autonomous interventions by civil society (Pellizzoni 2001). 
But where these new participatory approaches become institutionalised in appropriate ways, it is 
possible that they may help catalyse wider engagements, and also contribute more direct tangible 
consequences for the trajectories followed by institutional, technological and economic change 
(Fischer 1990). 
 
The benefits of these approaches are especially pronounced where they serve to ‘open up’ (rather 
than ‘close down’) the picture yielded to policy discourse of what constitute feasible, viable or 
appropriate social choices (Stirling 2008a). It is a well-established feature of most existing 
approaches to social appraisal aiming at informing policy on knowledge, innovation or development 
that they produce ‘unitary prescriptive’ outputs to decision-making (Stirling 2005). Instead of 
‘opening up’ a plurality of possible recommendations to policy, each with its associated conditions, 
these methods instead deliver their findings as a single ‘verdict’, ‘consensus’, ‘conclusion’ or ‘result’. 
In this respect, these participatory methods actually hold much in common with conventional 
quantitative expert-based methods of policy appraisal – like risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis or 
decision theory – with which they are often contrasted (Stirling 2006). These latter expert calculative 
methods also yield unitary prescriptive outputs to policy, but in the form of variously aggregated 
‘average’, ‘modal’ or ‘optimal’ numerical values (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). In effect, all approaches 
to policy appraisal that deliver ‘unitary prescriptive’ results to decision making and wider political 
discourse – whether quantitative or qualitative – are founded on the usually tacit assumption that 
there exists (at least in principle) some definitive, broadly favourable, most preferable configuration 
for the decision in question. It is this presumption that the advent of these new more diverse 
approaches to social appraisal offers the potential to help ‘open up’. 
 
There is a need for care in making this argument. Although practice varies widely across the world, 
the design (if not implementation) of conventional policy appraisal methods is often clear that single 
definitive ‘optimal’ configurations will be difficult to characterise in advance, and may be 
misidentified. It is well known that appraisal findings are subject to many uncertainties and context 
dependencies. There is usually strong awareness of the ways in which ambiguities and conflicts can 
arise between contending perspectives, and considerable effort can be devoted to reconciling these. 
And dynamic rates of change are well understood to mean that recommendations may in any case 
become superseded by the time they are realised. The argument is that despite these important 
qualifications it still tends to be assumed in conventional social appraisal that (under any given 
context, at some specific time and subject to prevailing knowledges) a particular trajectory may in 
principle be assumed to be ‘the best one’. This is why we find preoccupations with: the ‘bottom line’ 
in business; ‘probability distributions’ in risk assessment; ‘optimality’ in economics; ‘evidence-based 
decisions’ in policy making; ‘justification’ in politics and ‘consensus’ in participatory deliberation. All 
of these have the effect of promoting unitary notions of the most favourable course for future 
progress. 
 
What these widespread presumptions are doing is neglecting the value and importance of diversity. 
This is true in three ways. First, with regard to the inputs to social appraisal, concerning the visions, 
issues, values, options, interests, priorities, uncertainties and perspectives that are included for 
attention. Second, diversity is suppressed in the outputs to decision making where ‘plural and 
conditional’ possibilities are virtually always collapsed to unitary prescriptive recommendations. The 
third, arguably most important, neglected role for diversity involves the more tangible outcomes of 
decision making and the subsequent institutional commitments. This concerns the variety and 
disparity of the strategies, policies or technologies that are actually implemented. As such, it is about 
the forming rather than the informing of social commitments. Instead of pursuing a single ‘optimal’ 
trajectory, we might instead deliberately seek to construct diverse portfolios of pathways, carefully 
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tailored to accommodate divergent perspectives, compensate for each other’s weaknesses and 
realise complementarities. The better we understand the plurality of potentialities in human 
progress, the more we appreciate the severity of our neglect of the value of ‘not putting all our eggs 
in one basket’ in this way.  
 
An example might help to illustrate what a ‘diversity of pathways’ might mean in practise. Perhaps 
the most prominent particular area where this issue is discussed in existing global governance of 
innovation and development is in the electricity supply sector (Bazilian and Roques 2008). There is 
widespread policy attention to the benefits of retaining a diversity of fuels, resources, technologies 
and supply chains (Farrell et al 2004). Take the case of a country that is well-endowed with 
continuous rainfall, displays a distributed agrarian population and extensive tracts of unsettled, 
under-utilised mountainous terrain – like Norway or New Zealand. Under such conditions, context-
sensitive harnessing of small-scale hydroelectricity typically presents as the most favourable 
electricity supply option, due to the sufficient resource and strong economic, environment, social 
and operational flexibility benefits. Despite these virtues however, recognition for the value of 
pursuing a diversity of trajectories in this sector might nonetheless reasonably prompt avoidance of 
an over-commitment on small-scale hydroelectricity and complement this instead with some 
balanced mix of additional electricity supply options. This might be the case even where the 
complementary options are acknowledged to display individually inferior performance to 
hydroelectricity (Stirling 1994). The point is that the quality of diversity in the portfolio as a whole 
may be seen to offer a series of additional benefits that are not realised by pursuit of any single 
option on its own, no matter how favourable this may seem to be (Stirling 2009b). Similar 
considerations might lead to the pursuit of diverse portfolios of trajectories in areas like housing, 
agriculture, transportation, communications, and so on. 
 
So what are these benefits on the part of deliberate pursuit of diverse portfolios of trajectories in 
knowledge production, innovation and development? The main argument developed in the present 
paper arises from the distributional issues discussed above. Where there exist divergent socio-
political interests and values, it is a fundamental finding in axiomatic rational choice theory that there 
cannot exist – even in principle – any purely analytical means definitively to reconcile the resulting 
contrasting preference orderings (Arrow 1963; Kelly 1978). This refutes the value of the aggregated 
quantitative results routinely produced in social appraisal by methods like cost benefit analysis, risk 
assessment and decision theory (Stirling 2003). It also highlights that the ostensibly unitary 
outcomes realised in participatory deliberation may also raise issues of representativeness, 
contingency and legitimacy with regard to wider constituencies and discourses (Scoones and 
Thompson 2001). In particular, the ‘closing down’ of appraisal by either qualitative deliberative 
approaches or expert analytic methods often equally have the effect of excluding the values or 
interests of the poorest and most marginal people (Stirling 2008a). In such cases, where there can 
exist no analytic or deliberative ‘fix’ for irreducible political contention, the deliberate pursuit of a 
diversity of pathways allows divergent imperatives to be reconciled that could not otherwise be 
resolved (James 1990). By upholding this general value of diversity as a means to accommodate 
political plurality, there arises the further particular opportunity for the poorest and most marginal 
groups to ensure that pathways reflecting their own authentic interests and values are included in 
the diverse mix. The fixation on unitary ‘optimal’ trajectories does not so readily allow this. 
 
A second major benefit of deliberate pursuit of a diversity of pathways arises from the crucial role of 
uncertainty. It has already been discussed that acknowledgement of the essentially plural nature of 
progress has the effect of extending and deepening the appreciation of uncertainty. Representations 
of knowledge move from an apparent picture of ‘risk’, through a less tractable state of ‘uncertainty’ 
to a more profoundly indeterminate condition of ignorance (Wynne 1992). It is with respect to these 
less tractable aspects of incertitude that diversity presents the most robustly practical response 
(Stirling 1994). Where we don’t know what we don’t know, then we ‘don’t put all the eggs in one 
basket’ (Stirling and Mayer 2000). Diversity helps provide resilience against surprising shocks and 
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robustness in the face of unexpected stresses (Folke et al 2002). It does not depend for its value on 
any claim definitively to have characterised the problematic uncertainties (Stirling 2008). All that is 
required is that a diverse array of pathways be identified in relation to divergent values and interests 
like those just discussed. This involves pursuing a variety of disparate trajectories, balanced in 
relation to the apparent performance of each as viewed under contrasting perspectives (Stirling 
2007a). This is again excluded by a fixation on unitary trajectories, but provided by a strategy of 
diversity. 
 
A third cluster of benefits of diversity in research, innovation and development, concerns the quality 
of creativity and innovation itself. In detailed economic and social studies of technologies, creative 
activities and organisational behaviour, it is becoming increasing clear that a diversity of 
interconnected technological trajectories, social practices and institutional cultures can play an 
important role in fostering more effective and robust forms of innovation (Rosenberg 1982; Landau 
et al 1996). In part, this arises because diversity militates against processes of autonomy (Winner 
1977), momentum (Hughes 1983) and lock-in (Arthur 1989), as discussed earlier in this paper when 
considering the directions of progress. By sustaining in close contact over extended periods a 
coherent variety of technological trajectories, social practices and institutional cultures, 
diversification can help catalyse many kinds of learning and cross-fertilisation (Grabher and Stark 
1997). It also maintains an opportunity for options that would otherwise have been ‘crowded out’ to 
realise economies of scope and scale and more specific learning benefits of their own (Mitchell and 
Woodman 2006). Finally, diversity helps resist associated concentrations of institutional power that 
might otherwise compound the predicaments of marginal groups.  
 
In all these ways, the quality of diversity presents particular synergies with Sustainability agendas in 
knowledge, innovation and development (Stirling 2008b). As was surveyed in the introductory 
section, the social dimension of Sustainability focuses centrally on the empowering of marginal 
communities and the accommodating of plural interests and values. Sustainability debates have also 
led to particular emphasis being placed on precautionary responses to uncertainty (UN 1992). The 
demanding challenges of Sustainability reviewed earlier (like poverty alleviation, climate change, 
biodiversity loss) also present strong imperatives for radical forms of social, technological and 
organisational innovation (Stirling 2008b). In addition, the emphasis of Sustainability discourse on 
the need for context-sensitivity highlights a further benefit of diversity as a means to more 
effectively respect varied local geographical, ecological, cultural or political conditions. Aspirations to 
single ‘optimal’ trajectories derived under a unitary model of progress all serve intrinsically to 
undermine this aspect of Sustainability. Deliberate diversification provides a means to resist this. 
 
Having identified these various positive features of diversity, it must be remembered that, depending 
on the perspective, diversity also presents a number of countervailing challenges. Diversification 
away from what appears under any perspective to be the most favourable technology or practice 
necessarily involves some trade-off or compromise on performance. It is in this sense that diversity is 
rarely a ‘free lunch’ (Weitzman 1992). Likewise there may variously arise increased complexity, 
‘transaction costs’ (Williamson 1993), loss of coherence (Cohendet et al 1992) and barriers to 
accountability (Grabher and Stark 1997). Where it becomes a euphemism for persistent differentials 
in patterns of cultural privilege – as in Apartheid South Africa – diversity can also raise serious 
questions over equity. The crucial challenge thus lies in striking a balance between the benefits of 
diversity and these countervailing considerations in the governance of knowledge, innovation or 
development portfolios (Geroski 1989). The value of the ‘diversity premium’ (Ulph 1988) that is 
warranted under any given perspective or context will be a function of the performance attributed to 
individual energy options and the contributions that each makes to system diversity (Stirling 1994). 
In the end, all such issues are judgemental, offering ample scope for legitimate disagreement. 
Recognition of these complexities underscores the importance of a systematic general framework 
for exploring different perspectives on the implications of energy diversity (Mercier and McGowan 
1996; Bruno et al 1991).   
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There is also a question over the extent to which diversity may arise as an emergent consequence of 
technological and institutional dynamics, and the degree to which it should require deliberate 
governance interventions. Increasingly transnational capital flows, regulatory standardisation, 
trading harmonisation, market concentration and globalising governance are all exerting 
homogenising effects on worldwide patterns of knowledge production, innovation and development 
(Barry 2001; Feenberg 2002; Young et al 2006). Such developments are widely documented to be 
reducing global diversity in behavioural, technological and institutional configurations in areas like 
food production, energy services, public health, materials management, urban mobility, information 
and communication (Misa et al 2003). To set against this though, there remain in the world, 
persistent contextual variabilities, emergent differentiations and continuously randomising impulses 
– all of which act to resist any finality in these processes of closure (Archibugi and Michie 1997). 
These ‘real world’ complexities will always likely yield some residual degree of diversity. The particular 
form and vigour of deliberate intervention that may be appropriate to secure requisite levels of 
diversity will thus vary from context to context. There is likely to be great value in systematic and 
transparent frameworks for analysis and deliberation over the contending issues, and rendering the 
outcomes more robust and accountable. Elements of these already exist in forms that can directly 
support this kind of policy (Yoshizawa et al 2008). The central point is simply that an appreciation of 
the plural nature of progress prompts greater attention to the value of diversity as much in the 
concrete outcomes of technological and institutional development as in the inputs and outputs to 
the social appraisal of the options.  
 
In concluding this final substantive section of this paper, it is worth returning to a theme introduced 
at the beginning. It was argued that many of the most problematic features of unitary models of the 
dynamics of knowledges, innovation and development might be traced to longstanding 
‘Enlightenment’ notions of progress. Originating earlier and far more widely – and sustained 
independently in other contexts – not all these problematic features are actually specific or unique 
to this tradition. Nor has this tradition itself always been interpreted in the fashion of current 
hegemonic ‘one track’, ‘no alternatives’, ‘way forward’, ‘race to the future’ concepts of progress. 
Nonetheless, the Enlightenment is most often attributed with the insight that knowledge, 
technology and society itself might in different ways be subject to advance over time. The point that 
arises from the above consideration of diversity is that recent developments in social, economic and 
political thought around progress may now be initiating a collective insight that is as potentially 
momentous as the Enlightenment. The simple linear notion of advance is being augmented by the 
crucial additional concept of direction. A new and vastly more assertive role is thereby afforded to 
human agency and the (potentially) deliberate exercise of social choice. Features of the world and 
unfolding history that were previously deemed pre-ordained and immutable are now becoming 
recognised as subject to collective action. In effect, in appreciating the importance of directionality 
and diversity for greater realisation of human potential, we appear to be moving from mere 
‘Enlightenment’ to more promisingly progressive ‘Enablement’.  
PLURALISING PROGRESS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The argument advanced in this paper is easily summarised. Worldwide, current hegemonic ‘unitary’ 
notions of progress allow highly specific instrumental interests and normative commitments to be 
represented as ontologically objective and inevitable. It is in this way that global governance of 
knowledge, innovation and development resounds with loudly-asserted ‘one track’, ‘no alternatives’, 
‘way forward’, ‘race to the future’ rhetorics. Political discourse thus risks sinking into a tautologous 
and self-referential circularity in which whatever happens to emerge from dominant structures of 
power and privilege in existing institutions and markets is implicitly held to constitute self-evident 
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‘progress’. The advent of high-profile political debates over Sustainability helps to address this. These 
emphasise the need for attention to specific normative imperatives around human wellbeing, social 
equity and environmental integrity. This in turn helps make more explicit and visible the inherently 
contestable normativity in any notion of progress, and thus the necessity for more open and 
deliberately evaluative political discourse. However, Sustainability debates are themselves subject to 
similar rhetorical processes. Normativity-excluding languages of sustainability are repeatedly used in 
instrumental ways to legitimate and justify manifestly unSustainable and regressive practices and 
outcomes. 
 
In seeking to overcome these challenges, this paper argues for greater attention to three inherent 
attributes of progress: direction, distribution and diversity. These are as relevant to our 
understandings as to our evaluations of processes of change in knowledges, innovation or 
development. Crucially, it emerges that there is no evidence for the existence of any single uniquely-
necessary pathway for change. Neither the apparent existence of regular patterns and periodicities 
in particular historical processes nor the manifest asymmetries in the sequencing of different 
configurations of institutions and technologies in any way necessarily support the one-path 
(‘unicursal’) notion of progress. Instead, wide analytical literatures spanning many disciplines present 
a wealth of evidence for the ways in which a range of different social, economic and political 
mechanisms actively shape the directions taken by progress in knowledge, innovation and social 
development. These processes serve to select and ‘close down’ around a small subset of the 
potentially technically feasible, economically viable and socially realisable pathways. The result is to 
prompt the replacement of existing mainstream unitary notions of progress with a more plural model 
highlighting the property of directionality.  
 
Much work in economics has contributed formatively to these insights. Yet economics as a whole 
persistently fixates on ‘scalar’ (rather than ‘vector’) understandings of progress. These suppress 
recognition of the qualitative importance of directionality, and so help support untenable 
mainstream unitary rhetorics. This in turn presents particular problems in addressing distributional 
issues. Attention remains focused on the scope for ameliorating the implementation of particular 
dominant trajectories, thus serving to help ‘close down’ appreciation of the diversity of alternative 
possible pathways for progress. This has the effect of further compounding existing patterns of 
inequity, exclusion and disappropriation. In order to help counter this, there exists a wide array of 
broader-based methods, practices and institutions for ‘opening up’ the social appraisal of alternative 
trajectories in knowledge, innovation and development. In addition, the more deliberate and explicit 
pursuit of diverse portfolios of such pathways offers a series of wider benefits. In various ways, these 
involve helping to: foster more productive and creative innovation; hedge against intractable 
uncertainty and ignorance; accommodate contrasting contexts and irreconcilable interests and 
values; and mitigate the effects of global concentration and ‘lock-in’. Only through ‘pluralising 
progress’ in this way may we hope to fulfil fundamental imperatives to enable greater social agency, 
political equality and economic equity in knowledge, innovation and development. By ‘broadening 
out’ social appraisal and ‘opening up’ a more vibrant politics of choice and diversifying across a 
variety of disparate pathways, we may truly hope to realise the multiple dimensions of human 
potential.   
CODA: MYTHS OF PROGRESS 
One final question is prompted by this argument. How have such vibrant, diverse and enquiring 
global societies arrived at a situation in which mainstream understandings of progress in knowledge, 
innovation and development are so consistently impoverished and untenable? How can linear, 
deterministic ‘sound science’, ‘pro-technology’, ‘way forward’, ‘no alternatives’ rhetorics remain so 
under-challenged? Why are scalar attributes of progress so widely emphasised in academic analysis 
with so little interrogation of the crucial property of directionality? In order to better understand this 
rather stark state of affairs, it might be useful to return to a theme addressed right at the beginning 
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of this paper and briefly contemplate a broader, longer-term view. Here, an especially salient insight 
again comes from social anthropology, to the effect that the best way to identify key tensions and 
contradictions at the heart of any culture is to study the associated ‘origin myths’ (Nye 2003). Far 
from representing anachronistic survivals, these well-worked ‘master narratives’ (Lyotard 1984) often 
pinpoint the most acute sources and loci of contemporary political friction. 
 
As already mentioned, it is often easier to appreciate such deeply challenging insights from the 
outside rather than the inside of a culture. It is in this self-reflective mode that we may view the well-
documented situation among some herding peoples, for instance. Among the Maasai of East Africa, 
for instance, women tend traditionally to bear the burden of tending the cattle whilst the men enjoy 
most of the benefits of ownership. This is well explained and thus justified (within the cultural 
context) in the associated creation narrative. In this story, the women’s own carelessness led them to 
lose the herds with which they were originally provided! If evidence is required, the narrative can 
point to the existence of wild beasts roaming the savannah (Kipury 1978). Likewise, the awesome 
powers of the medieval European church rested largely in its role as mediator of the ubiquitous 
imperative to atone for ‘original sin’. But for the disobedience of Adam and Eve at the beginning of 
the World, there would have been no need for such demanding and intrusive disciplines. Any doubts 
were easily countered by pointing to constant threats of righteous divine retribution through ever-
imminent flood, plague and famine (Deanesley 1969). Incidentally, there also arose in this tradition a 
similar gendered theme to that in the first example, in that contemporary privileging of men over 
women was also often linked to attributions of responsibility for this ‘original sin’ primarily to Eve 
rather than Adam. Either way, the same pattern is clear, in which prevailing understandings of 
cultural origins address the most acute axes in contemporary social tensions.  
 
So too in modern globalising cultures might there be a significant link between active political fault-
lines and our own ‘master narratives’ concerning the most salient features of our origins. Here 
however, the central tensions cluster not so much around segregated gender roles or moral control, 
but focus instead on modernistic notions of ‘progress’. As we have seen, incumbent power structures 
sustain their privilege in a complex, dynamic and indeterminate world by exerting a shaping influence 
on the directions taken by progress in knowledge, innovation and development. The ubiquitous 
impact on patterns of structural change affects everyone’s lives, serving as a major source of friction. 
In countering inevitable dissent, few resources are more disarming than deterministic 
understandings of ‘sound science’, objectivising notions of ‘the way forward’, disabling assertions of 
‘no alternatives’ or consequent fatalistic resignation that ‘you can’t stop progress’ (Norgaard 1994).  
With modern notions of ‘progress’ then, the formative role of the creation myth lies not in the ‘fall of 
man’ but in an entirely contrasting story. This current canonically ‘progressive’ origin narrative was 
conceived, and is still celebrated, as Darwin’s ‘progress towards perfection’ (Darwin 2004:489; cf: 
Richards 2005; Lewontin 2005).  This remains the basis for contemporary understandings of our 
relationships with other life despite the equal antiquity and manifestly multidirectional orientations 
of advance in innumerable different species-specific trajectories (Gould 1988a). Persistently 
reflecting supposedly obsolete colonial prejudice, this story of inexorable evolutionary ‘ascent’ 
(Bronowski 1979) is extended to differentiate in a stratified way between human societies (Diamond 
1998). The story is one of ever increasing scientific sophistication and technological ingenuity. This is 
emblazoned in the scientifically-accredited eponymous ‘wisdom’ of homo sapiens ‘the tool maker’ 
(Corbey 2005). Again, this is despite increasingly manifest evidence for familiar ‘human-like’ kinds of 
cognition and toolmaking in other animals that significantly blur the scientific standing of this 
boundary (Wynne 2001; Emery and Clayton 2004). Yet it is in this way, so the story goes, that an 
inexorable race along the path to modernity passed through successive ages of ‘stone’, ‘bronze’ and 
‘iron’ – each notably defined in terms of technology (Clark 1977). Now we look forward in similar vein 
to futures variously defined and moulded by a cherished singularity in the orientation and staging of 
our knowledges and innovations:  genetics, cybernetics, nanotechnology, neuroscience, 
astronautics, nucleonics (Allaby 1995; Berry 1999). If challenged, the evidence for both origins and 
destiny lies all around. Have our lives not been transformed by technological progress? Was there 
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ever a time when it was not a dominant force? Is innovation not accelerating at an ever-increasing 
pace? Does there seem any prospect for its exhaustion?  Do we really want to ‘go back to the Stone 
Age’? 
 
As with all such origin stories, however, the picture is not quite all that it seems. Even if they are 
accepted as unproblematic, general acknowledgement of increasing sophistication, ingenuity and 
rates of change in particular directions, does not explain or justify the substance or orientations of 
these specific trajectories taken by knowledge and innovation. Just because a particular plant may 
flourish and climb at a specific spot does not mean that another might not have grown there equally 
well – or  even better. Just because a person may acquire a degree of knowledge, experience or 
happiness in a chosen path of life does not preclude that these might have been matched, or 
exceeded, in another. Just because a traveller may journey far and learn much on one route does not 
mean that a different direction of travel might not have got them further or taught them more. Of 
course, the journey would then have fostered learning of a different kind. In a similar way, evidence 
for the undoubted general importance of progressive advance in human affairs says nothing of the 
specific merits of long term pursuit of particular directions for enquiry and understanding, or specific 
orientations for innovation and social change.  
 
Talking of ‘progress’ in the way we do is thus akin to speaking of growth independently of form, of 
age independently of biography, or of a journey in terms only of the distance rather than the route. 
Since we have no problem articulating our experience of properties of quality and orientation in 
these other familiar developmental processes, there seems little reason why we should not be able 
to recognise essentially similar features in the general dynamics of human progress. It is in the 
evident attenuation of this collective ability in modern policy discourse, that we find the real 
discursive power of our own particular ‘origin myth’. By treating knowledge, innovation and 
development as if they were simple ‘scalar’ quantities, the prevailing narrative of ‘unicursal progress’ 
neglects that these crucial areas of life also display normative ‘vector’ qualities, contending 
orientations and path-dependent histories. Different styles and directions for social, institutional and 
technological change may embody similar levels (if different forms) of ‘progress’. This is the crucial 
point that is missed in current political rhetorics around ‘sound scientific’ decisions, ‘anti-technology’ 
cultures and ‘pro-innovation’ policies as ‘the way forward’ in the ‘race to the future’.   
 
That mainstream politics in such otherwise sophisticated societies should find it so easy to persist in 
this kind of ‘baby talk’ is testament to the gravity of our collective impairment. Our evaluative senses 
are dulled. Quiet voices remain unheard. A diversity of alternative futures is blinkered from sight. We 
need to restore these arrested social faculties. By pluralising our understandings of – and 
commitments to – progress, we catalyse a more vibrant, enabling and democratic politics of choice. 
It is only in this way that we may live up to the full promise of human potential in realising more 
robust, diverse and Sustainable pathways for knowledge, innovation and development. 
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